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ABSTRACT. This paper provides an empirical case study
of the relationship between corporate social responsibility
(CSR) and the new competition regulation in the
Netherlands. The leading question in this case study is
whether the new institutional arrangement has allowed for
the possibility that reasonable exceptions can be made to
the principle that inter-firm cooperation is prohibited.
That is to say: does the new institutional arrangement
allow for the possibility of ‘well organized but not ‘perfect’
markets’? The investigation focuses on the Netherlands,
which constitutes an exemplary case as the Dutch are
committed to both strengthen the competitiveness of the
market and allow for exceptions on behalf of non-eco-
nomic values such as CSR. The authors expect that the
Dutch context will prevent a doctrinal and categorical
rejecting of any good argument to make an exception to
the rule that inter-firm cooperation must be prohibited.
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Introduction
This paper provides an empirical case study of the
relationship between corporate social responsibility
(CSR) and the new competition regulation in the
Netherlands. The new law is devoted to the reali-
zation of competitive markets and assigns the task to
oversee possible breaches of the law to the Nether-
lands Competition Authority (NMa). It is an
important assumption of the law that inter-firm
cooperation will decrease competitiveness. Prohibi-
tion of any inter-firm cooperation therefore is one of
the principle ways in which competitiveness is
secured. The leading question in this case study is
whether the new institutional arrangement has
allowed for the possibility that reasonable exceptions
can be made to the principle that inter-firm coop-
eration is prohibited. That is to say: does the new
institutional arrangement allow for the possibility of
‘well organized but not ‘perfect’ markets’? This case
study derives its relevance from the ongoing dis-
cussion within the context of theorizing on CSR on
the feasibility or even the possibility of CSR, as this
phenomenon seems to presuppose inter-firm coop-
eration – at least on competitive markets. In order to
situate the case study we will start by providing a
brief sketch of this discussion.
Ever since its inception as a theoretical and
practical concept, CSR is surrounded by a major
concern: Is it possible or feasible on a well-organized
market, given that a well-organized market is com-
petitive and therefore will leave very little discretion
to suppliers? The concern is for example voiced by
Cottrill (1990, p. 725): ‘You can have CSR or com-
petition, but not both’. The concern can be given a
theoretical backing by means of neoclassical eco-
nomic theory (See for example Baumol, 1975;
Baumol and Batey Blackman, 1991; Dubbink,
2003). Neo-classical economic theory conceptual-
izes a well-organized market as a ‘perfect market’. A
perfect market is characterized by perfect competi-
tion. Perfect competition means that all parties are
price takers (Hayek, 1980). In their rivalry for
market share the competing parties are so pressed by
the hard discipline of the market that none of the
parties can influence the market price. This price is
at its lowest possible level. Consequently, the market
parties do not have any discretion or freedom of
action to mould the market process. Ideally, each
market actor makes just enough money to cover all
costs, thereby maximizing the consumer surplus.
This has major consequences for the possibility of
CSR. Following Carroll we define CSR as the
moral obligation of business entities ‘to pursue those
policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of
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action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and
values of [...] society’ (Carroll, 1999, p. 270).1
Pursuing those policies will somehow always involve
costs. CSR therefore is impossible on a perfect
market. By definition, market actors cannot cover
the costs involved and thus cannot make room for
the necessary discretion. A subsequent conclusion
that many critics of CSR draw on the basis of this
argument is that CSR only appears on imperfect
markets. Market actors have some discretion on
these markets, since – by definition – imperfect
markets are markets in which actors do have some
power to influence prices.
How have scholars in favour of CSR reacted to the
charge that CSR is only possible on markets that are
not well organized? Often it is argued that in fact all
actually existing markets are to some extent imperfect.
A disadvantage of this strategy is that CSR is neces-
sarily depicted as a marginal, second best phenome-
non. This is one of the reasons why van Luijk (2000)
argues that the response by CSR protagonists has been
insufficient. According to him, business ethics as a
discipline has ignored or at least neglected the insti-
tutional aspects and limits of moral conduct in a free
market. However, even if generally true, there have
been some business ethics scholars who have tried to
take into account the institutional side of market
morality. Jeurissen and van der Ven (2005 and 2006;
see also: Dubbink, 2003) are an example. They add a
fundamental argument to the position that CSR is
possible because of the imperfection of all actual
existing markets. Basically, Jeurissen and van der Ven
reject the Neo-classical conception of the free market.
That is to say: even though Jeurissen and van der Ven
acknowledge both that individual companies hardly
have any room for manoeuvre on markets with fierce
competition and that fierce competition is in principle
a good thing, they do not dismiss the concept of CSR
as impractical for that reason. Their solution is that ‘the
principle of moral displacement’ (De George, 1999,
p. 97) should be applied to this case. This principle
acknowledges that moral actors may be confronted
with collective action problems, while trying to meet
their moral responsibilities. According to the princi-
ple, actors should organize their responsibility at the right
level in order to meet their moral responsibilities. In
the context of contemporary markets, this level will
most likely be the industry level. It is important to note
that the principle of moral displacement is not meant
to generally halt competition. According to the prin-
ciple, competition must only be tempered exactly at
those places where competition causes external effects.
To see why this suggestion by Jeurissen and van
der Ven goes against the grain of Neo-classical
economic thinking it must be understood that the
authors in fact make a radical conceptual move.
They distinguish between the concept of a perfect
market and the concept of a well-organized market. A
well-organized market is a market that is competitive
to such an extent that the advantages of organizing
an economy as a market are sufficiently realized.
(Some of these advantages are for example adequate
allocation of the means of production, a great con-
sumer surplus, and innovation.) Next to that, a well-
organized market also is conducive to realizing a
well-organized society.2 The ‘perfect market’ is the
Neo-classical instantiation of that concept. How-
ever, as Jeurissen and van der Ven seem to argue, it is
not necessarily the only or the best instantiation.
According to them a market is better organized if it
is sufficiently competitive but also leaves some room
for discretion and thus CSR.
Another way to formulate the radical nature of
the proposal by Jeurissen and van der Ven is in terms
of the need for or prohibition of inter-firm coop-
eration. Jeurissen and van der Ven hold that on
competitive markets CSR is only possible if there is
some form of inter-firm cooperation.3 Without such
cooperation, firms cannot afford the costs involved
in CSR. Jeurissen and van der Ven hold that some
forms of inter-firm cooperation need not necessarily
block the competitiveness of the market. This sug-
gestion is incompatible with the Neo-classical
assumption that, on a perfect market, actors work in
complete isolation from each other. Isolation guar-
antees competitiveness. Within Neo-classical think-
ing, market actors are thus not allowed to come into
contact with one another and thus make arrange-
ments of any kind. Any sort of arrangement could
result in some form of discretion. Inter-firm coop-
eration of any kind thus is barred. Because of their
concern for CSR, Jeurissen and van der Ven break
with the absolute prohibition against inter-firm
cooperation. They suggest that some kinds of inter-
firm cooperation will not damage a well-organized
market. A well-organized market is not necessarily
the same as a perfect market in the Neo-classical
sense.
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In the context of this paper, it is important to
understand why Neo-classical thinking has such a
deep distrust against inter-firm cooperation. In fact,
the distrust against inter-firm cooperation precedes
Neo-classical thinking and at least goes back to the
days of Adam Smith. Smith (1776, book 1, chapter 10)
famously remarked that ‘people of the same trade
seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public’. In a recent paper Kimman (2006,
pp. 165–167) points at one of the important reasons
that might feed this distrust. Interestingly, Kimman
acknowledges that CSR depends on inter-firm
cooperation. In his view CSR is only possible if
competitors are allowed to contribute collectively to
setting the norms for competition.4 However, then he
makes the point that the distinction between a trust
aimed at limiting competition and an industry asso-
ciation aimed at environmental protection is a matter
of perspective. What is judged positively by one party
may be seen as undesirable by another. That is to say:
inter-firm cooperation cannot be allowed for on a
well-organized market because there are no reason-
able, let alone objective, criteria by means of which we
can distinguish reasonable exceptions from unrea-
sonable ones. Since it is all ‘a matter of perspective’ the
risk is simply too big that we are only serving some
partisan business interest, cleverly disguised as a CSR
initiative. Thus we are confronted with an either/or
decision: either we lock out any form of inter-firm
cooperation (and accept the possible disadvantages of
that decision because the advantages are much bigger)
or we will end up in the swamp of exceptions and
subjective arguments that will in the end disrupt the
working of the competitive free market system. In
terms of an example: in the chicken industry, where
competition is fierce, we cannot allow chicken
farmers to make any kind of collective arrangement in
the interest of animal welfare. It is principally impos-
sible to distinguish a sincere proposal that in fact only
helps the chickens from an insincere one that in fact
cuts out competition.
This study tries to follow up on this discussion. It
wants to make a modest contribution to answering
the question whether we are indeed confronted with
an either/or decision in this matter. Is it possible to
allow for exceptions to the principle that inter-firm
cooperation must be prohibited on a well-organized
market? Is it possible to find reasonable principles
and the make reasonable judgements in cases at hand
and thus reasonably distinguish business efforts to
help the public from business efforts to conspire
against the public? We think that finding an answer
to this question is important, given two opposing
contemporary tendencies in thinking on the free
market system. On the one hand we are confronted
with the need for markets that are fiercely compet-
itive; on the other hand we are confronted with the
increasing need for business to take a role in gov-
ernance (see for example: Scherer et al., 2006).
Latter-day discussions and studies in the context of
the WTO underline the global importance of the
issue (Vedder, 2003). In this context we need to
know whether well organized (i.e., fiercely com-
petitive) but not ‘perfect markets’ are possible.
Of course, settling this issue will involve a theo-
retical investigation into the possibility of rational
practical reasoning, as the possibility of this faculty is so
often being questioned in the 20th century (Weber,
1921). However, we follow Habermas’ rebuttal of
Webers skepticism in this respect (Habermas, 1981).
In this paper we concentrate on a much smaller issue.
We turned to the empirical world and simply studied
the way in which contemporary competition law is
organized. We investigated whether exceptions have
been considered or actually have been made by the
authorities, even if these authorities were strongly
committed to installing competitive markets. Distin-
guishing our empirical question from the fundamental
one is relevant. Even if practical reasoning is actually
possible, our latter-day culture may very well still be
under the spell of Weberian thinking. We assumed
that if it is believed that the (judgements leading up to
these) exceptions can be based on reasonable princi-
ples, then we have reason to qualify the thesis that we
are confronted with an either/or decision, in the sense
that at least in the perception of reasonable actors,
these exceptions can be made. This conclusion is of
course reinforced if these exceptions specifically
concern CSR. We have limited our investigation to
the recent Dutch situation (1997–2005).
Some assumptions
In order to understand the reasoning leading up to
our research question and our choice for a study of
the Dutch situation, three preliminary remarks have
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to be made. The first concerns the definition of
CSR. In this paper we assume that CSR presupposes
some discretion and that CSR is thus impossible on
Neo-classical perfect markets. The fact that CSR
presupposes some discretion follows from our defi-
nition of CSR as a moral obligation. A possible
objection against this argument is to say that CSR
and perfect markets may go hand in hand as long as
all the CSR activities of a company are profitable.
Actually, it is not uncommon to define CSR as a
specific sort of profitable business activity (Husted
and Salazar, 2006). However, we follow Scherer
et al. (2006, pp. 515–517; see also Friedman, 1970)
in their conclusion that at its core, CSR concerns an
additional moral role of business that cannot be fully
reduced to its economic role. We therefore maintain
that CSR does imply some discretion and is thus not
compatible with a perfect market.
The second remark concerns the nature of market
competition and its relation to the law. Economists
have a tendency to conceive of competition as a
natural phenomenon (Commons, 1924) and thus are
easily inclined to contrast a natural situation of per-
fect competition with an unnatural situation of
interfering with this natural situation by means of
law. Such thinking feeds either/or thinking. Now,
perhaps it is true to say that some forms of compe-
tition are inherent in the natural world and grow
spontaneously. All kinds of animals compete with
one another. However, there is nothing spontaneous
about the kind of competition that should reign on
the free market – thus creating all kinds of beneficial
consequences. Market competition is an artifact,
created by institutions grounded in the law (Pigou,
1920, p. 128; see also: Engelen, 1995; Hodgson,
1988; Polanyi, 1944). Without strict laws, market
actors would perhaps not fully give up all forms of
competition but they would not only compete. They
would hatch pacts with some competitors against
others and/or with some other competitors against
the public etc. They would probably also not restrict
their means of competing to the ones beneficial to
the good working of the market. The end result
would probably look more like a war scene than a
market place.
That market competition is an artificial situation
construed by competition law, makes one under-
stand the assumption of Jeurissen and van der Ven –
and embraced in this paper – that competition needs
to be organized and that this organization does not
necessarily have to take one and only one form. It
also clarifies why allowing for exceptions with regard
to competition may not necessarily be an either/or
issue. Finally, it also illuminates why this paper
concentrates on investigating competition law. It is
therefore important to explicate that we assume that
market competition is a construct, created by the
state by means of the law. In fact it is a difficult
process that requires permanent attention since if
there is something natural about markets, it is not the
businessman’s strive to rule out a competitor but his
strive to rule out competition itself. Society there-
fore not only stands in need of good laws but also in
need of executive institutions that supervise market
processes.
The third remark touches on our choice to focus
the investigation on the Netherlands. Our basic
reason is that during the period under investigation
(1997–1995) the Netherlands in fact constitute an
exemplary case as the Dutch were committed to
both strengthen the competitiveness of the market
and allow for exceptions on behalf of non-
economic values such as CSR. During the 1990s
strong political forces within the Dutch government
were out to change the old competition law. The
Netherlands had always been a corporatist country
that allowed for many kinds of inter-firm and cor-
poratist cooperation (Couwenberg, 1953; Van Vliet,
1992). Due to scandals (such as the construction
fraud), changing international market conditions and
EU pressure the government came to believe that a
new competition law was due5 and that this law had
to be stringent and fully in line with EU regulation.
However, it is also true that CSR is considered
important in the Netherlands. And it is not just that
consumers, citizens and NGO’s find CSR impor-
tant. Parliament and the government also have em-
braced CSR and have declared that they strive to
promote CSR.6 We may thus expect politics to be
sensitive to the argument that fierce competition
may involve losses, such as obstructing the possibility
of CSR and consequently that the Dutch context
will preserve us from a doctrinal and categorical
rejecting of any good argument to make an excep-
tion to the rule that inter-firm cooperation must be
prohibited.
In the following four sections we will provide an
overview of the case, starting with a brief history of
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the new competition law. Our analysis follows in
section ‘‘Analysis of the case study and conclusion’’.
Aims of competition regulation
in the Netherlands
The Dutch Competition Act (DCA) of 22 May
1997 is the main national law for the regulation of
economic competition in the Netherlands.7 Regu-
lation in the Netherlands is modelled closely after
European regulation, and shares many similarities
with regulation in a number of other EU member
states. In addition to the DCA, another important
instance of competition regulation that affects the
Dutch market is European Union (EU) regulation.
European competition regulation is enforced by the
European Commission and based primarily on the
EC Treaty of 1957, which established the prede-
cessor of the EU. The main purpose of EU com-
petition regulation is the creation of a common
market (Scherer, 1994, pp. 34–35; SER, 2003,
p. 25). In 1957 the EC Treaty required the adhering
states to open their markets to one another. They did
this by removing tariff barriers. However, an addi-
tional requirement was that monopolistic practices
would cease. Otherwise certain markets would be
de facto inaccessible to foreign competitors. Build-
ing and strengthening the common market remains
the primary raison d’etre of the EU, which is fun-
damentally a political institution. Therefore, EU
competition regulation goes beyond purely eco-
nomic considerations.
Since 1 May 2004 all national competition
authorities are empowered to apply the provisions of
the EC Treaty. Also national courts may apply these
provisions directly.8 The main focal points in the
European Commission’s competition policy are
anti-trust policy, merger control, liberalization, and
state aid. In the context of CSR, anti-trust policy
and merger control are the more important themes
because they refer directly to business activity. Anti-
trust regulation at the EU level consists of two main
elements: the prohibition on anti-competitive
agreements (EC Treaty article 81) and the prohibi-
tion on abusing a dominant market position (EC
Treaty article 82). Merger control is aimed at
preventing diminishing competition as a result of the
merger of two or more enterprises.
The Dutch Competition Act has three main
elements, which mirror the part of EU regulation
that is aimed at enterprises: the prohibition on anti-
competitive agreements (DCA article 6), the pro-
hibition on abusing a dominant market position
(DCA article 24.1), and merger control. To a very
large extent these elements in Dutch law are either
identical or complementary to EU regulation.9 DCA
article 6 is copied directly from EC Treaty article
81.10 Moreover, in various articles the Dutch
Competition Act refers explicitly to EU regulation.
For the purpose of the present study it is important
to note that Dutch law functions in close conjunc-
tion with EU regulation. Moreover, the contents of
Dutch law – and the way in which it is enforced –
reflect to an important extent the main EU rules that
apply to competition behaviour by enterprises in the
Netherlands.
Before the Competition Act came into effect on 1
January 1998, competition regulation in the Neth-
erlands had been far less stringent. In the mid-1990s
Minister of Economic Affairs G.J. Weijers was
responsible for the preparation of the proposed law
and its submission to parliamentary approval. To
explain to parliament, the need for the DCA, he
pointed at the implications of the process of glob-
alization.11 According to Weijers, the Dutch econ-
omy needed to become more competitive vis-a`-vis
the global economy. This could be achieved only if
existing anti-competitive practices, which in effect
shielded sections of the Dutch market from inter-
national competition, would be abolished. The law
was adopted by parliament without major changes.
The primary purpose of the DCA – as intended by its
makers – therefore is to eliminate anti-competitive
practices in order to make the Dutch economy more
internationally competitive in the long term.
The Competition Act stipulates that its enforce-
ment is the task of the Netherlands Competition
Authority, known as NMa (‘Nederlandse Mede-
dingingsautoriteit’), which formally has this func-
tion since 1 January 1998.12 The NMa has the
mandate to investigate instances of suspected brea-
ches of the Competition Act. Companies found
entering into agreements with competitors or
abusing a dominant position with the aim of lim-
iting competition are fined. The NMa can also
prohibit mergers if they have a limiting effect on
competition. In addition to enforcing the DCA,
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the NMa also has the task of enforcing articles 81
and 82 of the EC Treaty in the Netherlands, as
well as implementing and supervising the Electric-
ity Act (1998) and the Gas Act (2000).13 On 1 July
2005, as a result of a modification of the DCA, the
NMa became an autonomous government agency
(ZBO, zelfstandig bestuursorgaan).14 This means that
although the agency is funded by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, the minister is responsible only
for appointing the NMa’s board of directors.15
With regard to inter-firm cooperation, the DCA
stipulates that ‘agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices of undertakings, which have as their
objective or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition on the Dutch market, or
part thereof, are prohibited’ (DCA 6.1). However,
the prohibition does not apply to agreements,
decisions or concerted practices that ‘contribute to
improving production or distribution, or promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit’. In
order to be allowed such cooperation, it must not
‘impose on the undertaking concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives, or afford such undertakings the
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products and services in
question’ (DCA 6.3). The prohibition also does not
apply to cooperation involving a low number of
firms and a low combined size in terms of turnover
(DCA 7.1).
In principle, all forms of inter-firm cooperation
that noticeably affect competition are illegal. This
applies not just to formal agreements, but also to
‘concerted’ behaviour that results in limiting com-
petition. Exemptions are allowed for cooperation
leading to technical or economic progress, but never
if this burdens consumers or threatens competition.
The Competition Act aims at removing existing and
precluding potential restrictions to competition.
CSR as a potential ground for exception
The DCA does not mention the term ‘corporate
social responsibility’ or a closely related term. In
1997, when Dutch parliament discussed the pro-
posed Competition Act, demands were voiced by
some Members that social, cultural, and environ-
mental interests ought to be taken into account
when enforcing the DCA. Minister of Economic
Affairs Weijers felt that such so-called ‘non-
economic interests’ should be secured through sep-
arate laws. Nonetheless, he promised parliament that
he and his successors would take action if cultural,
social, environmental, housing, or healthcare inter-
ests are at stake. In case it happened, the minister
would instruct the NMa, at the general level, to
change its policy.16 In 2001 and 2002 this issue was
discussed again in parliament when Weijers’ suc-
cessor, Minister A. Jorritsma, proposed to change the
Competition Act in order to give the NMa more
autonomy.17 Two aspects in particular were high-
lighted in this discussion.18
First, there were concerns about the lack of
political supervision regarding the relationship be-
tween competition law enforcement and general
public interests. The Labour Party (PvdA) stated that
it was not yet sufficiently clear how competition
regulation related to general public interests such as
environmental or social themes, and that it therefore
was too early to remove direct political supervision.
A broad range of parties – Labour, the Green-Left
Alliance (Groen Links), the Christian-Democratic
Appeal (CDA), and the Christian Union (Christen
Unie) – worried that a more autonomous NMa
would in practice come to decide on how compe-
tition and societal aims are to be balanced against
each other. The CDA explicitly used the term CSR
(maatschappelijk ondernemerschap) in this context. For
the time being, all wanted government to stay in
charge of deciding on cultural, environmental, and
social issues in relation to competition.
The minister refuted these concerns by arguing
that NMa’s mandate is sufficiently clear. Thus,
minister Jorritsma maintained that there is no need
whatsoever for the minister of Economic Affairs to
retain the right to intervene in decision-making on
individual cases.19 The Competition Act is ‘an
economic law with economic aims’. The NMa can
carry out what is stipulated in this law, and there-
fore has to keep to economic considerations.
Consistent with this line of reasoning the minister
further argued that although the DCA allows
exemptions in relation to non-economic aims,
exemption can never be granted merely on non-
economic grounds. Still, Minister Jorritsma also
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pointed out in parliament that she, as minister,
would still retain the right to issue general instruc-
tions to the NMa on policy rules for deciding on
interests other than economic interests.
Second, there were concerns that the NMa would
overemphasize the importance of competition. The
Labour Party feared that an increase in the NMa’s
discretion could turn competition into an absolute,
while it should more properly be seen as a principle
that is not necessarily always the most desirable in
societal terms. The Green-Left MPs pointed out the
danger that the NMa might avoid making decisions
on non-competition themes altogether. Conse-
quentially other public interests than competition
simply would not be taken into account.
The minister rebutted that whether or not certain
issues are to be exempted from competition regu-
lation is a matter to be settled through legislation.
Thus Jorritsma repeated her predecessor Weijers’
position that limitations to competition regulation
are external to the Competition Act. These matters
should be addressed in separate laws. In a newspaper
article published in 2001 the minister argued that
CSR is full well possible under maximized compe-
tition. As she saw it, some companies tend to use
corporate social responsibility as an excuse to
establish trusts. She therefore made it clear that the
NMa would maintain its restrictions on inter-firm
cooperation, and that she believed that this would
leave ample room for CSR.20
In 2002, independent legal experts evaluated the
functioning of the DCA. They concluded that it is
not desirable that attempts would be made to
establish more clearly how much room there is for
non-economic criteria under the Competition Act.
They feared that this would produce a flood of
arguments that would be uncontrollable by the
NMa.21 They, too, came to the conclusion that, if
necessary, non-economic interests should be pro-
tected by new legislation that would stipulate in
which instances anti-trust prohibitions are not
applicable.
The Social and Economic Council of the
Netherlands (SER), the main advisory body to
government and parliament on economic and social
issue, has noted that competition law tends to
favour direct government regulation of social and
environmental issues over ‘self-regulation’, or
voluntary (CSR) initiatives by business (SER, 2002,
p. 46). The SER advised the Dutch government to
insist on a revision of the criteria in EC Treaty
article 81.3, which stipulate the reasons for
exemption to the prohibition on inter-firm coop-
eration (SER, 2003, p. 57). The SER believes that
non-economic criteria such as cultural and envi-
ronmental interests should be taken into account by
the NMa.22 The government chose not to follow
or to respond to this advice.23
From 1998 until mid-2005, when the NMa
gained its status of autonomous agency, it had been
possible for the minister to intervene in individual
NMa decisions if these conflicted with the broader
public interest. In theory, this might have been the
case if it became apparent that the work of the NMa
interfered with the promotion of CSR. The Min-
istry of Economic Affairs is also the main coordi-
nating institution for policy-making on CSR in the
Netherlands. However, no intervention has ever
been made by the minister, regardless of the reason.
The discretion of the NMA
After the new competition law was issued, the role
of the NMa – as the upholder of that specific law –
became more important, especially so since the NMa
has some discretion with regard to applying the law
to specific cases. As such the NMa declared its
mission to be ‘to make markets work’. It thus lined
up more with the DCA the main purpose of which
is enhancing the competitiveness of the Dutch
economy, than with the EU regulation’s aim to
create a common market and thus further European
integration. A well-functioning market is defined as
following by the NMa: ‘Wherever markets operate
properly, undertakings will compete for the favour of the
consumer. Such market operations have proved to be the
most beneficial to stimulating innovation and efficiency.
This contributes to general prosperity.’24 To the NMa
the ultimate criterion to evaluate competition is
whether the consumer is disadvantaged.25 To
determine what is in the interest of consumers, the
NMa looks at the quality and prices of products26:
‘Increased competition results in novel and high-
quality products with a more favourable price/
cost-ratio’.27 Thus, while regulation itself is aimed at
maximizing the intensity of competition in the
Dutch market, the NMa’s touchstone for this is
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consumer welfare in terms of price and quality of
available products.
The main publication in which the NMa explains
how it assesses various types of inter-firm coopera-
tion is the ‘Richtsnoeren Samenwerking Onder-
nemingen’ (Guidelines on cooperation between
undertakings, hereafter ‘Guidelines’).28 Also with
specific regard to cooperation aimed at CSR, this is
the main guideline provided by the NMa.29 The
Guidelines make it clear that whether a form of
cooperation is prohibited depends on a large number
of variables, such as firm size, firm type, and the
nature of the agreement. It therefore is difficult to
decide whether a particular instance of cooperation
is prohibited without a detailed investigation and
without consulting the NMa on a specific case.
Cooperation between companies aimed at CSR
in supply chains takes two basic forms. One is hor-
izontal cooperation, between competitors. The
other is vertical cooperation, between a supplier and
a client firm. In order to get a full picture of the
NMa’s policies, we have to consider both types.
Regarding horizontal cooperation, the main prin-
ciple of the NMa is that all agreements between
competitors on price, market sharing, or selling
conditions that discriminate between buyers are by
definition aimed at limiting competition, and
therefore prohibited (Guidelines, pp. 10–11). The
NMa allows the sharing of information as long as this
does not result in gaining insights into the compet-
itive strategy of competitors (Guidelines, p. 17).
Cooperation must not reduce market participants’
uncertainty about each other’s behaviour. Important
factors in this context are the involvement of
information on prices, production, market output,
and customers; the level of detail; the frequency of
information exchange; and whether access to infor-
mation is restricted (Guidelines, p. 18). Cooperation
between competitors aimed at creating a counter-
vailing power to dominant customers or suppliers
must be considered prohibited (e.g., Bruins et al.,
2002, p. 19).
Vertical cooperation is an even more complicated
matter. The European Commission’s regulation on
block exemptions for vertical agreements applies to
the Netherlands, and is executed as such by the
NMa. The European Commission has published a
set of guidelines to explain the functioning of this
regulation.30 Vertical agreements are generally
allowed if the firms involved have a market share less
than 30%, and when certain conditions are taken
into account. The 30% market share applies to the
supplier role of the participating companies. Vertical
agreements are not allowed to contain ‘severely’
anti-competitive restrictions such as minimum or
fixed resale prices, or certain types of territorial
protection.31
Let us take a closer look at which pricing
restrictions are not allowed. Commission Regulation
No. 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 (EC)32 states
in article 4(a) that the block exemption to vertical
agreements does not apply if these are aimed at ‘the
restriction of the buyer’s ability to determine its sale
price, without prejudice to the possibility of the
supplier’s imposing a maximum sale price or rec-
ommending a maximum sale price, provided that
they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale
price as a result of pressure from, or incentives of-
fered by, any of the parties’. In other words, an
agreement between a supplier firm and a buyer firm
may not result in a fixed or minimum price for the
buyer firm’s customers. Vertical agreements that
result in a higher price for the end consumer thus are
not exempt from the overall anti-cartel prohibition.
Vertical inter-firm cooperation for CSR often
involve product certificates or codes of conduct.
Regarding agreements that involve product certifi-
cates it depends on specific conditions whether these
are allowed. In general, vertical agreements are not
likely to be exempt from anti-cartel prohibition if
they result in higher consumer prices or barriers to
new market entrants.33 This means that in principle
vertical agreements involving CSR certification are
possible, but only within strict limits. With regard to
codes of conduct, no stipulations are included in the
EC block exemption for vertical agreements.
However, the NMa guidelines cover this topic at the
general level, pertaining to any kind of inter-firm
cooperation. Codes of conduct are not allowed if
they restrict competition or if they set minimum
sales prices.34 Like certification, therefore, they are
possible under certain strict conditions.
Vertical agreements involving certification or
codes of conduct are generally possible, but those
involving prices often are not. Supply chain initia-
tives that involve establishing minimum prices to
cover the costs for socially and environmentally
sustainable production can be a problem, depending
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on the market share involved. But the real bottle-
neck is horizontal cooperation between companies.
If aimed at decreasing competitive pressure this is
not allowed by competition regulation.
The NMa and CSR
Unfortunately, it was not possible in this study to
establish with full certainty in how many instances
CSR-aimed cooperation between companies was
prohibited by the NMa. Cases in which the firms
involved explicitly used the term CSR (i.e., its
Dutch equivalent MVO) were not found among the
decisions publicly accessible on the NMa’s website.
Nor could an instance of cooperation aimed at
eliminating negative social or environmental effects
otherwise be found that was prohibited by the NMa.
Consulting a number of experts likewise produced
no information on specific instances where actions of
the NMa interfered with CSR initiatives.35
However, some information on the CSR-policy
of the NMA could be detected. The NMa made a
few comments on CSR in general and there are a
few cases that are of interest for our research. The
NMa’s official policy regarding inter-firm coopera-
tion with the purpose of CSR is that the agency
views such initiatives positively, but that they do
need to comply with the DCA.36 In its annual report
for 1999, the NMa explicitly stated that – within the
limits posed by the DCA – the agency may take
protection of the natural environment into ac-
count.37 It has done so in at least four decisions on
specific cases.38 However, the NMa has not indi-
cated whether it will take non-economic interests
other than the environment into consideration.39
Even if there are no cases that specifically deal
with CSR, there are some that are of interest for our
research. First, there are the before-mentioned cases
related to the protection of the natural environment.
We will take a closer look at one example that is
typical of these four cases involving the environ-
ment, the so-called Stibat case. Stibat is a foundation
created by Dutch manufacturers and importers of
batteries, intended to carry out their legal obligation
to take responsibility for the collection and recycling
of used batteries.40 In 1998 the NMa decided that
Stibat is exempt from the DCA with regard to the
joint collection and removal of batteries, including
defining the extra price per battery to be paid by the
participating manufacturers and importers.41 The
NMa reached this decision because the collection
system served both environmental and economic
purposes.42 However, exemption was not granted
with regard to the Stibat practice of obliging the
participating companies to charge to their customers
(wholesale companies) the full amount of the costs
for battery removal. The NMa requires participating
companies to retain the option of charging less than
the full costs to customers in order to become more
competitive.43 This case suggests that the NMa al-
lows a certain degree of cooperation aimed at
environmental purposes, even if it involves prices
and if environmental damage was already precluded
by the existence of a specific law. The NMa allowed
this under the condition that economic purposes are
likewise served and that competition is not affected.
A price raise that precludes the possibility of in-
creased competition was not allowed in this instance.
Next to the environmental cases there are two
cases partly related to CSR, that are of interest for
our purposes. One of these cases is the so-called
‘milk dime’ case. This case involved a price agree-
ment intended to support producers. In 2001 major
Dutch supermarket chains and milk processing firms
decided to raise the consumer price by 10 cents in
order to support Dutch farmers, who were in eco-
nomic difficulty because of an outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease. However, the extra funds would not
be distributed to the farmers but to the milk pro-
cessing firms, which are cooperative enterprises
representing the farmers. The NMa prohibited this
common ‘solidarity price’, stating that it did not
object to companies supporting their supplier farm-
ers, but to the fact that consumers are being forced to
do the same. The NMa demanded that the inter-
firm price agreement must be ended so that com-
petition would be restored.44
The next case concerns a prohibition in 2003 by
the NMa on inter-firm agreements in the shrimp
fishing industry was claimed by a Dutch member of
the European Parliament (A.J. Maat, CDA) in a
newspaper interview to be a case of anti-CSR
interference by the NMa.45 The issue at stake,
according to Maat, was that fisheries and other firms
jointly decided to set fishing quotas in order to
protect fish stocks. The aim of the agreement was
thus said to be an example of sustainable business.
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However, according to the NMa the companies
involved were unable to substantiate that their
agreement was indeed aimed at preserving fish
stocks.46 The NMa also noted that the type of
shrimps involved are not in danger of disappearing,
as was evidenced by current EU policy, and that the
setting of fishing quotas was a matter for the EU or
its member states.
What can the absence of NMa decisions involving
unambiguous examples of CSR tell us? The NMa is
unable to investigate all possible breaches of the
DCA that occur in the Netherlands. The agency
must decide how it deploys its resources, and is free
to decide whether to investigate a specific instance.47
In principle, the competition authority supervises all
market sectors, with a special focus on markets with
a high degree of concentration and on shrinking
markets.48 This suggests that CSR is not a factor in
the NMa’s selection process with regard to its own
investigations. The fact that there have been few or
perhaps no confrontations between the NMa and
CSR initiatives suggests the possibility that CSR is a
marginal phenomenon in the Netherlands (at least in
fiercely competitive markets).
This could yet be related to the DCA. Its exis-
tence might deter firms from entering into cooper-
ative agreements, or even preliminary contacts.49
Since CSR-aimed cooperation is not a priori either
allowed or prohibited, but subjected to a compli-
cated set of conditions, the companies face the risk
that they may inadvertently breach the law.
Addressing this risk involves legal expenses that
could make the whole scheme unattractive, if pos-
sible public relations risks are considered to be less
threatening. An evaluation of the DCA found that
many firms have taken precautionary actions to
avoid being fined by the NMa.50 According to
Millstein and Katsh (1981, p. 50), ‘even where
activities present borderline questions [where it is
difficult to say whether they are prohibited] corpo-
rations in many cases will tend to choose those
commercial strategies presenting the fewest anti-trust
risks consistent with commercial objectives in-
volved’. Bruins et al. (2002, p. 23) mentions that
sometimes industry associations find that the limi-
tations on inter-firm cooperation obstruct environ-
mental purposes. It is also conceivable that firms use
the existence of the DCA as a pretext for not
heading the call of NGOs to take certain CSR
initiatives. A Dutch NGO, the Netherlands Society
for Nature and Environment (Stichting Natuur en
Milieu), claims that it learned from some of its
business contacts in the food sector that these are
deterred from inter-firm agreements for CSR that
involve price setting (SNM, 2003, annex 2).
Analysis of the case study and conclusion
The aim of this case study on recent Dutch com-
petition law has been to contribute to the issue
whether a well-organized market necessarily has to
be a perfect market in the Neo-classical sense. It was
inferred that well-organized markets do not neces-
sarily have to be perfect markets if reasonable and
specific principles can be formulated that can allow
for exceptions. This possibility depends on the
availability of objective – or inter-subjective –
criteria, i.e., practical reason as such. But it also
depends on the conviction of concrete reasonable
beings that these principles exist. The case study
provides us with the opportunity to say something
about the latter. Two questions have to be distin-
guished in this regard: (1) do these concrete humans
anticipate the possibility of formulating these prin-
ciples at all? and (2) do they anticipate this possibility
within the scope of CSR? In order to get a clear
sight these questions must be answered twice: once
in relation to the process of law making and the law
itself (the framework level) and once in relation to the
discretion of the NMa.
If we take the first question at framework level we
can observe that neither parliament nor the gov-
ernment foresees any problems here. Both accept the
proposition that at least some reasonable principles
can be formulated that allow for the possibility of
making reasonable exceptions. After all, parliament
tries to convince the government that the law must
somehow allow for exceptions with regard to the
environment or social values. The government does
not accept this argument. But it does allow for
exceptions when these ‘contribute to improving
production or distribution, or promoting technical
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit’. If we answer the
first question at the level of the NMa, we have to
come to the same conclusion. Again, the NMa
does not oppose to the idea of exceptions to the
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inter-firm cooperation as such. It allows for all kinds
of exceptions and uses the proposition that inter-
firm cooperation must be in the interest of the
consumer.
If we take a look at the second question at
framework level, we must conclude that there has
been some tension between parliament and gov-
ernment. Parliament does believe that reasonable
exceptions can be made for CSR. According to
parliament it is possible to organize a well-organized
market and allow for inter-firm cooperation geared
at fostering CSR. (Otherwise it would not have
called for this exception.) The government did not
accept the proposition. It argued that it is unwise to
infect the competition law with all kinds of non-
economic concerns. Parliament therefore held it
against government that it made economic goals into
an absolute. This reproach is not completely justi-
fied. The government did not turn against non-
economic values. It turned against a particular way
of achieving these values, i.e., it turned against a
particular way of organizing the market. After all,
according to the Dutch government these goals had
to be achieved by making separate laws.
Still, in the context of this paper it is somewhat
unfortunate that the government mainly opposed
parliament by pointing out an alternative way to
realize non-economic values. As a consequence, it
did not explicate why exactly it stringently opposed
allowing for exceptions to achieve non-economic
goals. Was its opposition prudently motivated, in the
sense that it believed that it is more accurate or
proper to pursue non-economic goals by means of
separate laws? Or was its opposition fed by the
fundamental fear of subjectivism, as this was en-
dorsed by the ‘independent legal experts’? We can-
not be sure. This is particularly unfortunate because
many proponents of CSR (see for example Scherer
et al., 2006) justify the necessity of CSR by claiming
that this other route – realizing non-economic val-
ues by means of separate laws – is impassible. CSR is
important exactly because of the ‘limits of law’
(Dubbink, 2003; Scherer et al., 2006). It can thus be
stated that the issue how these other values can be
realized has not been sufficiently addressed in the
Dutch discussion. Consequently, the question why
the government objected to allowing for exceptions
to the principle that inter-firm cooperation on behalf
of CSR has also not been sufficiently addressed. The
government used an escape route that allowed it to
ignore the issue. Consequently, we now are not able
to determine whether the refusal to allow for
exception was grounded in some partisan or political
motive or whether it was grounded in the belief that
no relevant distinction can be made between
exceptions on behalf of economic reasons and
exceptions on behalf of CSR.
Looking at the second question at the level of the
NMa, we are again confronted with tension, this
time a double one. The first tension concerns the fact
that the NMa on the one hand states that it is well
disposed to CSR. On the other hand however, the
NMa explicates that it will not allow for exceptions,
exclusively grounded in fostering CSR. There has to
be some benefit for the consumer as well. However,
since the NMa has not thoroughly explicated its
views on CSR, we do not know why the NMa does
not want to make this exception. Possibly, the NMa
holds that making exceptions on behalf of CSR will
lure the organization into subjectivism. It might also
be the case that the NMa thinks that making this type
of exception is unnecessary, given alternative ways to
realize the values behind CSR.
The second tension concerns a difference between
the NMa’s principle that it will not consider CSR
cause for exception and its actual reasoning in some
specific cases. Since the actual outcome of the milk
dime case and the shrimp case seems to obstruct
CSR and since the NMa only conditionally went
along with the Stibat case, we might be inclined to
conclude that the NMa in fact poses an important
obstruction to CSR. However, if we focus on the
NMa’s reasoning and not on its conclusion in the
milk dime case and the shrimp case, then we perhaps
should qualify that conclusion. In fact, the NMa did
not simply reject these exceptions because they
violated the principle that any inter-firm coopera-
tion must also benefit the consumer. In both cases
the NMa went much further in its reasoning. In the
milk dime case it questioned whether the initiative
had anything to do with CSR, which indeed is a
good question to ask. The milk dime case seems to
be an exemplary case of one group spending another
group’s money. Thus, there is much to say in favour
of the NMa conclusion that this has little to do with
CSR. Again, interesting about the shrimp case is
that the NMa does not simply dismiss the initia-
tive because it goes against the consumer’s interest.
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Instead it tries to give a substantive argument
showing that the arguments of the industry were not
solid. The concerned shrimps were not in danger of
depletion and the measures taken by the industry
were not geared to preserve the stock. Thus in both
cases the NMa did come to a considered judgement
that some might want to redress but in which non-
economic values (nature, solidarity) seemed to have
gained more than just an additional value.
Before coming to a conclusion, let us look at the
case from a different angle. The new DCA and the
policy of the NMa have sometimes caused com-
mentators to voice their concern for the possibility
of CSR. It is not uncommon to suggest that CSR
will be impossible under the new institutional
arrangement, since no form of inter-firm coopera-
tion will be allowed. Thus, L. De Waal, then
chairman of an important Dutch Labor Union, sta-
ted that the new arrangement would make it harder
for companies to cooperate with each other to
achieve common CSR aims.51 Again, in a recent
article in the Financial Times Europe it was noted that:
‘Companies that want to foster responsible business
practices may be surprised to learn that they must
also be careful not to breach the law. Certainly,
when it comes to one recent trend – for companies
in an industry to group together to address labour
and environmental conditions – they must pay
attention to how such collaborations may be viewed
by anti-trust regulators’.52 If we look at the few
encounters between CSR and the NMa we might at
first sight be inclined to interpret the evolving
experience as proof of that concern.
However, in our case study we have looked at
the issue from another angle. We have taken up the
issue whether well-organized markets necessarily
have to be perfect markets in the Neo-classical sense
or whether other types of markets might also be
considered well organized, in the sense that there is
room for reasonable exceptions to the rule that in-
ter-firm cooperation ought to be rejected, on the
basis of reasonable principles. Looking at the Dutch
situation we can conclude that all actors involved
always see room for some exceptions based on
reasonable principles. Some actors, such as (parts of
the) Dutch parliament also explicitly maintain that
CSR gives cause for reasonable exemption. Other
actors, such as the government and the NMa seem
to have some fear that allowing for CSR will throw
us in the swamp of subjectivism. However, the
principle discussion on this subject has not been
pursued. The government avoids touching on the
issue by claiming that other means are available to
realize non-economic values. What is more, the
NMa seems to consider cases of CSR more thor-
oughly then it must, based on its principle that CSR
does not have independent meaning. We may
therefore conclude that many actors in the Dutch
case do not conceive of allowing for exceptions as
an either/or choice. They believe reasonable prin-
ciples can be formulated and reasonable judgements
can be made to allow for exceptions. At least in that
regard well organized but not perfect markets are
possible.
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